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obiter dicta. Read in conjuction with the opinions in Powell v. Texas, such
comments may indicate the advent of new developments in the area of
criminal law. Nonetheless, conceding the existence of the insanity defense,
the decision of the Washington court ranks as a needed reform measure. 45
Matthias Lydon
45 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Washington court's reasoning
insofar as the governing of psychiatric expert opinion testimony is concerned in United
States v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1968) and United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920 (4th Cir. 1968).
LANDLORD-TENANT-BREACH OF COVENANT TO
REPAIR-RECOVERY OF CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES: THE RESTATEMENT RULE
AS THE TENANT'S WEAPON
Prior to signing a lease for a house, Meda and Joe Reitmeyer obtained
from Harold Sprecher, their prospective landlord, an oral promise that he
would either repair or provide materials for the repair of a certain obvious
defect. The defect was in the rear porch of the demised dwelling and consisted
of loose or missing wood in the porch floor. The Reitmeyers occupied the
premises under the lease on August 3, 1965, with knowledge that the defect
had not been repaired. They subsequently gave occasional reminders to
Sprecher concerning his covenant to repair the defect. These reminders were
not heeded. On October 7, 1965, Meda Reitmeyer fell at the point of, and as
a result of, the defective flooring and sustained personal injuries. The
Reitmeyers brought an action against Sprecher in tort for his negligent failure
to repair the defect and sought to recover for the personal injuries suffered
by Mrs. Reitmeyer. Although the cause of action arose from defendant's
breach of his covenant to repair, plaintiffs alleged a tortious failure to per-
form such contract. Hence, the plaintiffs claimed as the basis of their cause
of action the existence of a contract, yet the damages were not for the land-
lord's breach of contract but for his negligence in failing to perform his con-
tractual duties. Nor did the complaint contain any allegations that the de-
fective portion of the dwelling was under the control or in the possession of
the landlord. The house occupied by the Reitmeyers, as entire premises, was
under the complete control and in the possession of the tenant. Since the basis
of the alleged tort liability was the contract, the Reitmeyers contended that
the oral promise was supported by consideration, the consideration being
their having entered into the lease in reasonable reliance upon the promise to
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repair. The trial court entered judgment for defendant-landlord on the basis
of the weight of precedent in Pennsylvania to the effect that an action in
tort for negligence will not lie for the breach o a covenant to repair in the
absence of misfeasance on the part of the promisor-landlord, or in the
absence of a duty imposed upon the landlord by law.' The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court and adopted the rule of liability as
set forth in the Restatement of Torts.2 Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284,
243 A.2d 395 (1968).
According to section 357 of the Restatement and the rule in this case, the
negligent nonperformance of a landlord's covenant to repair will result in
the imposition of tort liability upon the landlord over and above his liability
for breach of contract. This is also an extension of tort liability for non-
feasance: the landlord entered into a covenant, performed no acts in pur-
suance thereof, and is thereby held liable for negligence. Thus, Reitmeyer
represents a hybrid theory of liability based upon the peculiar nature of the
landlord-tenant relationship. Such liability is based upon a failure to perform
an express contract or covenant to repair premises which, in the absence of such
contract or covenant, the landlord would otherwise have no duty to repair.8
This theory of liability, rendering a landlord responsible for consequential
damages flowing from his breach of the covenant to repair, has been gradually
adopted by eighteen of the thirty six states which have considered it.4 Thus
1 Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 34 (1937) ; Lopez v. Gukenback,
391 Pa. 359, 137 A.2d 771 (1958); Strothman v. Houggy, 186 Pa. Super. 638, 142 A.2d
769 (1958) ; Keiper v. Marquart, 192 Pa. Super. 88, 151) A.2d 33 (1960) ; Green v. Inde-
pendent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207 (1964) ; Pratt v. Scott Enterprises, 421 Pa. 46,
218 A.2d 795 (1966).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 357 (1965): "A lessor of land is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused to his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the
lessee or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the lessee
has taken possession, if (a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease
or otherwise, to keep the land in repair, and (b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk
to persons upon the land which the performance of the lessor's agreement would have
prevented, and (c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract."
3 Moss v. Hicks, 240 N.C. 788, 83 S.E.2d 890 (1954) ; Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App.
2d 70, 183 P.2d 325 (1947) ; Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d
Cir. 1957). See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (3d ed. 1964).
4 Collison v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919); Scholey v. Steele, 59 Cal.
App. 2d 402, 138 P.2d 733 (1943); Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262
(1935); Propper v. Kesner, 104 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1958); Waterbury v. Riss & Co., 169
Kan. 271, 219 P.2d 673 (1950); 2310 Madison Avenue, Inc. v. Allied Bedding Mfg. Co.,
209 Md. 399, 121 A.2d 203 (1956); Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N.W. 289
(1905); Fried v. Buhrmann, 128 Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935); Rosenberg v. Krinick,
116 N.J.L. 597, 186 A. 446 (1936); Lommori v. Milner Hotels, 63 N.M. 342, 319 P.2d
949 (1957); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Or. 223, 178 P. 234 (1919); Rampone v. Wanskuck
Buildings Inc., 227 A.2d 586 (R.I. 1967); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v.
Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916); Ross v. Haner, 244 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924), aff'd, 258 S.W. 1036 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924); Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash. 439,
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the general rule that no liability in tort will be imposed upon a landlord who
merely fails to keep his word by not repairing the defect is slowly disappear-
ing. The minority rule of the landlord's liability becomes the majority rule
with Reitmeyer.5 Moreover, Reitmeyer expressly overrules a long series of
Pennsylvania cases which have refrained from imposing tort liability upon
a landlord who has otherwise committed no tortious act.0
The object of this note is to examine Reitmeyer in light of the other cases
which have adopted the Restatement rule imposing tort liability for breach
of contract, and to question the principles of law and the public policy upon
which the rule is based. Also to be considered is the rationale of the courts
which have rejected this view and the protective devices of the tenant which
have apparently been rejected or ignored by Reitmeyer.
The grounds of tort liability of a landlord to his tenant with respect to
defective conditions in the premises are set forth in the Restatement of
Torts,7 and, but for the controversial section 357, are generally accepted. 8
This general rule, imposing no liability absent misfeasance, contains several
exceptions: a landlord will be liable for the injuries sustained by a tenant as
the result of undisclosed dangerous conditions existing on the premises
which are known, or should be known to the landlord; 9 such liability in
134 P. 1092 (1913); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
Illinois and Mississippi accept the rule subject to limitations: Alaimo v. DuPont, 4 Ill.
App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954) ; Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935);
Ford v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Committee, 223 Miss. 630, 78 So. 2d 743 (1955).
5 PROSSER, supra note 3, at 422: "An increasing minority of the courts, by now only
slightly less in number, have worked out a liability in tort for such injuries to person
or property, finding a duty arising out of the contract relation." Since that writing Rhode
Island and now Pennsylvania have worked out such liability; thus, the minority becomes
the majority.
6 For example, in Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 147, 191 A. 34, 36
(1937), the court stated: "Where the cause arises merely from failure to keep a promise
to repair, the remedy is in assumpsit. To found an action in trespass (tort), there must
be some breach of duty apart from nonperformance of the promise."
7Supra note 3; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 355-56 (1965).
S See, e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) ; Faber v. Creswick,
31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959); Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965). But cf. Zinn v. Hill Lumber & Inv. Co.,
176 Kan. 669, 272 P.2d 1106 (1954); Warner v. Fry, 360 Mo. 496, 228 S.W.2d 729
(1950). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965); Nunan v. Dudley
Properties, 325 Mass. 551, 91 N.E.2d 840 (1950); Socket v. Gottlieb, 187 Cal. App. 2d
760, 9 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1960); Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1
(1959); Sezzin v. Stark, 187 Md. 241, 49 A.2d 742 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Or TORTS §§ 360-61 (1965); Myrick v. Herrmann, 17 Ill. App. 2d 301, 149 N.E.2d 792
(1958); Southern Apartments, Inc. v. Emmett, 269 Ala. 584, 114 So. 2d 453 (1959);
Smith v. Kravitz, 173 Pa. Super. 11, 93 A.2d 889 (1953) ; Roesler v. Liberty Nat'l Bank,
2 Ill. App. 2d 54, 118 N.E.2d 621 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965).
9 See, e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953); Faber v. Creswick,
31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959); Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244
(1960) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965).
[Vol. XVIII
CASE NOTES
tort will be imposed where injuries result from defects in land leased for the
purpose of admitting the public; 10 liability will lie where the premises under
the control of the landlord are defective and injuries result from such de-
fective conditions;'" finally, where the landlord undertakes to make repairs
and performs such repairs negligently, liability will be imposed where injuries
result.' 2 There is one element common to these exceptions which does not exist
in the Reitmeyer case: the person whose welfare is endangered by the defects
stated above lacks either knowledge of the defect. or the ability to correct it.
In Reitmeyer the injured party had both knowledge of and the ability to
correct the defect or avail herself of an appropriate alternative course of
action.
Of the similar decisons preceding Reitmeyer,1 ' few have relied as heavily
upon the contract and public policy aspects of the issue as has this court.14
Pre-Reitmeyer cases imposing tort liability upon the landlord on the basis of
his covenant to repair have imposed such liability in reliance upon one of two
theories. One theory embodies the fiction that the landlord retains "control"
over the premises by virtue of his right to enter the premises and effectuate
the repairs.' 5 This would result in imposition upon the landlord of the same
liability as that which is imposed upon an occupier of land-to maintain the
land in such a way as to avoid causing injury to those rightfully upon it.
The use of the "control" fiction thus appears to admit the lack of any
liability upon the lessor as such. In discussing the "control" fiction, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Harris v. Lewistown Trust Company stated
that "this view is based upon the conclusion that liability in tort should
follow as a legal incident of occupation and control .... By the great weight
of authority, occupation and control are not reserved through an agreement
by the owner to repair."' 6 Other states have held that a covenant to repair
10 No cases in point have been decided. Cf. Zinn v. Hill Lumber & Inv. Co., 176 Kan.
669, 272 P.2d 1106 (1954); Warner v. Fry, 360 Mo. 496, 228 S.W.2d 729 (1950). See
generally PROSSER, supra note 3, at 418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965).
11 See, e.g., Nunan v. Dudley Properties, 325 Mass. 551, 91 N.E.2d 840 (1950) ; Socket
v. Gottlieb, 187 Cal. App. 2d 760, 9 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1963) ; Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co.,
30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959) ; Sezzin v. Stark, 187 Md. 241, 49 A.2d 742 (1946). See
generally PROSSER, supra note 3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 360-61 (1965).
12 See, e.g., Myrick v. Herrmann, 17 Ill. App. 2d 301, 149 N.E.2d 792 (1958) ; Southern
Apartments, Inc. v. Emmett, 269 Ala. 584, 114 So. 2d 453 (1959) ; Smith v. Kravitz, 173
Pa. Super. 11, 93 A.2d 889 (1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965).
13 Supra note 4.
14 But see Rampone v. Wanskuck Buildings Inc., 227 A.2d 586 (R.I. 1967).
15 De Clara v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 309 N.Y. 620, 132 N.E.2d 871 (1956); Noble
V. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 81 N.E.2d 40 (1948). But see Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26
N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958) ; Taylor v. Geroff, 347 111. App. 55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952) ;
Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949). See Comment, 48 MIcH. L.
Rxv. 689 (1950).
16 Supra note 6; Cavalier v. Pope, [19061 A.C. 428. The following statement of the
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has given the landlord such control,'17 but Reitmeyer has not purported to
so hold.
The Reitmeyer court predicates the tort liability of the landlord upon a
more proximate theory: that the negligence of the landlord is based solely
upon the lease contract, and not upon any fiction of control.
[N]egligence, not simply the breach of the agreement to repair, is the gist of the
action in tort and the agreement to repair does not render the landlord liable
unless he has knowledge of the defect when the lease is executed and the agree-
ment to repair made and then only when consideration can be found to support
the agreement to repair.' 8
Thus, the court looks to the lease contract as the foundation for the
landlord's duty owed to the tenant to perform the contract with reasonable
prudence. A breach of such duty is therefore tortious. Moreover, a condition
precedent to the existence of such a duty is the validity of the contract, thus
accounting for the requirement that the covenant to repair be supported by
sufficient consideration. The court finds that since the covenant to repair was
one of the terms of the agreement upon which the tenant is presumed to
reasonably rely, the covenant is therefore supported by the tenant's under-
takings in the lease, no further consideration being necessary. There are at
least two avenues of attack that could be pursued to indict the court's
rationale: how can an oral covenant to repair, if disputed by the landlord, be
conclusively considered part of the lease agreement when the lease is in
writing? Further, the rationale is tenuous, not in the court's finding that a
duty exists, but rather, in the conclusion of the court that a failure to
perform the contract constituted an actionable breach of that duty.
The Pennsylvania court admittedly bases its opinion upon a public policy
which must compensate the tenant for his supposedly inferior bargaining
position:.
[W]e must realize further that most frequently today the average prospective
tenant vis-a-vis the prospective landlord occupies a disadvantageous position.
Stark necessity very often forces a tenant into occupancy of premises far from
desirable and in a defective state of repair. 19
Hence this court, in advancing its version of public policy, maintains that
the landlord is in a position of strength when dealing with a prospective
English court was quoted by Chief Justice Cardozo in Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287,
290, 176 N.E. 397, 398 (1931): "The power of control necessary to raise the duty ...
implies something more than the right or liability to repair the premises. It implies the
power and the right to admit people to the premises and to exclude people from them."
17Supra note 15.
1SAccord, Page v. Ginsberg, 345 Ill. App. 68, 102 N.E.2d 165 (1951); Merchants' Cot-
ton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916).
'9 Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (Pa. 1968).
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tenant. Yet, by positing a requirement that consideration support the land-
lord's promise to repair, the court appears to imply the contrary-that the
landlord and the tenant are of equal bargaining power. It can be inferred
from the court's discussion of consideration that the tenants in Reitmeyer
would have looked elsewhere for a residence had the landlord not made this
promise. If the tenants were in fact acting out of "stark necessity," they
would hardly be in a position to demand a promise to repair from the
prospective landlord. Such a public policy decision as Reitmeyer will do little
to aid those impecunious persons for whose benefit it was rendered. What of
those who are forced to move into "premises far from desirable" where no
such covenant to repair is made by the landlord; will a landlord be deterred
by this decision? A promise to repair made to a tenant in a disadvantageous
position would likely be de facto gratuitous, rather than supported by con-
sideration. The good intentions of the instant decision are thus marred.
Reitmeyer by no means represents the tenant's sole recourse; there are a
number of soundly reasoned alternatives available to the tenant, formulated
by courts which reject the blanket imposition of tort law concepts on the
landlord's liability, as such. Especially applicable to the facts in Reitmeyer
are the options available to the tenant to repair the premises at his own
expense and deduct such expense from future rental payments,20 to sue for
the cost of repairs without waiting an indefinite period of time for the ful-
fillment of the promise,2 1 to sue the landlord for the difference in values
between the premises as defective and as in a state of repair, 22 or to abandon
the premises by virtue of constructive eviction.2 3 Also, state legislatures
have adopted statutes, civil and penal, in aid of the tenant.2 4 There is
authority that actions in tort will lie based upon such statutes. 25
20 Wallace v. Williams, 313 P.2d 784 (Okla. 1957); Kurland v. Massachusetts Amuse-
ment Corp., 307 Mass. 131 (1940); John Meckes & Sons Co. v. American Meat Co., 96
Ohio App. 17, 117 N.E.2d 191 (1954).
21 Mills v. Ruppert, 167 Cal. App. 2d 58, 333 P.2d 818 (1959); Sun Ray Drug Co. v.
Lawler, 366 Pa. 571, 79 A.2d 262 (1951); Hadcock v. Soslow, 257 App. Div. 906, 12
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1939).
22 Pappas v. Zerwoodis, 21 Wash. 2d 725, 153 P.2d 170 (1944); Coleman Holding
Corp. v. Altman, 150 Misc. 724, 270 N.Y.S. 81 (1934); Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d
738, 203 P.2d 778 (1949).
23 Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 637, 221 Cal. App. 2d 611 (1963);
Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Automobile Supply
Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930); Lynder v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 329 Mich. 359, 45 N.W.2d 319 (1951).
24 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN §§ 42.201,
42.203 (1947) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-12, 47-16-13 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 31,
32 (1951); S.D. CODE §§ 38.0409, 38.0410 (1939). See Feuerstein and Shestack, Landlord
and Tenant-The Statutory Duty to Repair, 45 ILL. L. REv. 205 (1950).
2 5 Finley v. Williams, 45 Ga. App. 863, 166 S.E. 265 (1932); Gray v. Capital Construc-
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Reitmeyer has, in purporting to adhere closely to the words of the
Restatement, deviated from subsection (a) of section 357 which prescribes
the imposition of tort liability, provided that "the lessor, as such, has con-
tracted by a covenant in the lease or otherwise to keep the land in repair."
The words of the Restatement apply where there has been a general covenant
to keep the land in a condition of repair. The covenant in Reitmeyer was
not "to keep the land in repair," but was a promise to repair or provide the
materials to repair a specific defect and nothing more. Thus, such covenant
would have no application to any other defect arising or existing on the
premises. It cannot be inferred from the landlord's promise that the landlord
was to accept responsibility for any injuries which might result from the spe-
cific defect in question. The alternative stated in the covenant that the land-
lord may provide materials for repair rather than actually repair would imply
that the landlord was giving assurance that the condition would be rectified
and nothing more. In the leading Illinois case of Alaimo v. DuPont,26 the
court held, in a fact situation similar to that of Reitmeyer, that the landlord was
liable for injuries sustained by the tenant where, at the time of contracting, it
was contemplated by both parties that the landlord would be liable for such
damages as might result if the defect were not cured. The Restatement uses
the term "contracted" in reference to the covenant of the landlord and Alaimo
stands in support of the necessity that there be a mutual manifestation of
assent in the terms of the contract.27 In the comment to section 357 of the
Restatement it is noted that, "[s]ince the duty arises out of the existence of
the contract to repair, the contract defines the extent of the duty." Of all the
courts which have sought to impose tort liability upon the landlord because
of his failure to perform his contractual duty to repair and which have dis-
tinguished between the general covenant to repair and a covenant to make
specific repairs only, only one court has held in favor of tort liability in the
latter but not in the former.28 A fair interpretation of Reitmeyer is that the
landlord assures the tenant that the tenant will not sustain injuries from a
defect which is obvious to both the landlord and the tenant.
The rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, being afield of
contract and property law, appears to be less practical in light of current de-
velopments in the landlord-tenant area rather than being "the sound and
sensible approach to the instant problem." 29 Section 357 of the Restatement
fion Corp., 131 Misc. 34, 225 N.Y.S. 446 (1927) ; Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J.
379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
2 0 Alaimo v. DuPont, 4 Il1. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954). Accord, Cromwell v.
Allen, 151 I1. App. 404 (1909); Farmer v. Alton Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 294 Ill. App. 206,
13 N.E.2d 652 (1938).
27 Alaimo v. DuPont, supra note 4. See also Leitner v. Braen, 51 N.J. Super. 31, 143
A.2d 256 (1958).
"SHodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935).
29 Supra note 19, at 398.
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is intended to put teeth into the enforcement of a landlord's general covenant
to keep the land in repair-a covenant wherein both parties contemplate that
the landlord will continually, upon being given notice, strive to make the
premises safe for those who would rightfully enter the dwelling or place of
business. Reitmeyer goes further and seeks to enforce a covenant not neces-
sarily contemplated by section 3 5 7-a covenant. to make specific repairs. When
stripped of its reliance upon the Restatement, the liability imposed upon the
landlord is based upon nothing but negligent nonfeasance. 0 A criticism of the
decision, therefore, is that it amounts to judicial legislation. As Chief Justice
Bell observed in his dissenting opinion: "What is the use of talking about
Stare Decisis, or increased litigation, or the terrible backlog of cases, if a
majority of this Court bury Stare Decisis at their daily or weekly or monthly
wish or whim?" 31
Robert Karr
30 See generally PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 54.
31 Supra note 19, at 399.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DRUG MANUFACTURERS-
AN ABSOLUTE DUTY TO WARN EXISTS NOTWITHSTANDING
MINISCULE STATISTICAL PROBABILITY OF HARM
In 1963, Glynn Richard Davis, age thirty-nine and in good health, received
Sabin oral polio vaccine (type III) at a West Yellowstone, Montana, mass-
immunization clinic. The vaccine administered was manufactured by Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., under standards devised by a subdivision of the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Division of
Biologic Standards, which, prior to the drug's dispensation, had tested the
drug and authorized its release. Prior to delivery to the clinic, however, sev-
eral reports-including a Surgeon General's Special Report-had indicated
that use of type III vaccine could potentially result in paralytic disease.'
Such potentiality of paralysis was extremely minimal when the drug was
administered to children, but as to the adult population the risks were greater,
albeit still statistically slight. Wyeth placed pertinent portions of these
findings on each bottle of the vaccine; however, these findings were neither
read by Davis, nor was Davis told of the risk involved in use of the drug.
Shortly after receiving the vaccine, he evidenced paralysis and other polio-
myelitic symptoms which subsequently resulted in permanent paralysis from
1 See 1962 SURcEON GEN. REP. (March and Dec.), and 1962 Ass'N ST. TERR. HEALTH
(Sept.).
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